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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the potential for mutual gains, the relationship between foreign investors and host 
governments is characterized by divergent interests resulting from the distributional process 
through which the policymaking apparatus allocates the costs and rewards of investment among 
various interest groups. While investors are interested in maximizing returns, governments have 
more complex preferences shaped by multiple interest-group pressures. Thus, the interaction of 
investors and governments throughout the investment cycle—i.e., from negotiation to investment 
to operation—is a protracted one in which a variety of contingencies and interest group reactions 
may undermine investors’ initial assumptions and calculations.  
The bargaining power perspective has produced an impressive body of theory and 
evidence on investor-government interaction (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Fagre and Wells, 
1982; Kobrin, 1987; Poynter, 1985; Svejnar and Smith, 1984), but has several limitations as well 
(Haggard, 1990). In particular, the literature has not yet met the challenge posed by Kobrin 
(1979) to identify “which events matter” and how “environmental processes affect investor 
perceptions,” toward which end he calls for “…better definitions of the phenomena, a conceptual 
structure relating politics to the firm and a great deal of information about the impact of the 
political environment.” In this paper, we draw upon neoinstitutional theories to generate 
propositions regarding the processes that trigger government attempts to overturn, alter or 
reinterpret bargains made with foreign investors, as well as the country-level institutional 
structures and organization-level characteristics that moderate pressures for change. 
Bargaining Power and Commitment 
The central insight of the traditional bargaining power perspective is that the balance of 
“resources controlled by one party and demanded by the other” (Kobrin, 1987: 617) influences 
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the division of profits between investors and the government. Investor bargaining power is 
posited to be at a maximum prior to investment, when the government needs access to scarce 
capital or technology, and then decline secularly once an investor sinks capital in the ground or 
its technology or expertise diffuses (Poynter, 1985; Vernon, 1977). As its bargaining power 
declines, an investor faces increased political risk as a result of the government’s incentive to 
redirect its returns to a broader set of interest groups (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Kobrin, 1987; 
LeCraw, 1984; Svejnar and Smith, 1984). 
The canonical bargaining model can be expanded by characterizing the relationship 
between foreign investors and host country governments as a repeated game in which formal 
commitment devices or reputation moderate the pressure for secular decline (Janeba, 2001a, b). 
Under this view, the central problem is analogous to the well-known “time consistency” problem 
in the government’s choice of capital taxation: in order to induce investment, the government 
may pledge low tax rates to investors, but such pledges are not credible because the government 
has an incentive to redistribute investor returns once the investors sink capital in the ground 
(Fischer, 1980; Kydland and Prescott, 1977). The literature on time consistency in monetary 
policy (Auernheimer, 1974; Barro, 1983; Fischer, 1977) is also relevant in this connection. These 
literatures suggest that “institutions” such as constitutional limits on retroactive taxation and 
independent central banks bolster the credibility of government commitments, thereby mitigating 
the time consistency problem and promoting capital investment.  
Institutions: Established and Emergent 
Structures intended to bolster credibility also play a critical role in securing new foreign 
investment, especially when the sector in question is “politically salient” as a result of economic, 
political, historical or cultural attributes that create a widespread public interest in its operation 
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or outcomes. Combined with large sunk costs and long payback periods, political salience 
creates the potential for conflict between investors and political actors, as the latter may face an 
ex post incentive to overturn a bargain or alter or reinterpret its terms in response to constituent 
pressures. Specific examples of credibility-enhancing formal structures that may be adopted in 
this case include a series of bilateral contracts between investors and the government, legally 
sanctioned market rules, and specialized administrative bodies charged with interpretation and 
enforcement.  
Formal structures such as these do not, however, generate credibility by sheer virtue of 
their existence. The economic literatures described above, including the bargaining power 
literature, either take for granted “institutional” status and assume that it generates credibility, or 
attribute credibility to the status quo bias that characterizes a formal legislative construction as a 
result of the political transaction costs of changing it (Dixit, 1996; McNollGast, 1989; Tsebelis, 
2003)—i.e., overturning it, altering it or reinterpreting it. While we explicitly address the role 
and sources of such transaction costs below, we highlight two additional sources of stability that 
influence the probability that change will appear on the policymaking agenda in the first place, 
and thus antecede political transaction costs as a source of credibility: (1) a bargain’s attainment 
of legitimacy, defined as “the generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574); and (2) the extent to which entrenched interests 
reinforce bargains from which they benefit.  
Both of these potential sources of stability are especially germane to new foreign 
investment because they accrue to a formal structure only with the passage of time; however, 
structures adopted to govern new foreign investment are themselves often newly constructed. 
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Indeed, according to the neoinstitutional perspective in organization theory, an institution’s 
primary source of stability is legitimacy attained on “cognitive” (Suchman, 1995: 579-81) 
grounds, that is, based on widespread, implicit acceptance resulting from the long-term process 
of “institutionalization” (Zucker, 1987). 
In order to distinguish the newly-created formal structures that we consider in this paper 
from those that have attained cognitively-based legitimacy, we refer to the former as “emergent 
institutions” and the latter as “established institutions” (simply “institutions” in common 
neoinstitutional parlance). This distinction does not imply that emergent institutions are 
necessarily illegitimate. Rather, the critical contrast is that, while the outcomes generated by an 
established institution are largely beyond normative evaluation as a result of the established 
institution’s “taken-for-grantedness,” the outcomes generated by an emergent institution are still 
subject to evaluation, which—if positive—may provide a “moral” basis for an emergent 
institution’s attainment of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 579-81).1 Consequently, whereas all 
investors face the risk that “politics or political players will have a negative impact on [their] 
firm’s asset values, costs or revenues” (Wilkin, 2000), those whose “bargains” are governed by 
an emergent institution face heightened political risk.  
A Neoinstitutional Model of the Policymaking Process  
The traditional bargaining power perspective depicts an investor’s level of political risk 
as a deterministic outcome of bargaining between the investor and a monolithic government. We 
expand this perspective by using various elements of neoinstitutional theory in economics, 
political science and sociology to explicate the mechanisms that generate political risk over the 
course of an investment’s lifecycle. These mechanisms operate through the policymaking 
process, wherein interest groups that vary in their level of organization (Denzau and Munger, 
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1986; Lowi, 1969; Olson, 1965; Wilson, 1980) attempt to influence political actors seeking to 
retain office (Kingdon, 1984; Lau, Smith, and Fiske, 1991) within the constraints imposed by a 
formal policymaking structure (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1980; McNollGast, 1987; Tsebelis, 2003; 
Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Weingast, 1981). The main agents of 
change in an emergent institution are the organized interest groups (Becker, 1983; Olson, 1965; 
Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1975) that are most dissatisfied with how it accommodates their 
interests (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Sjöstrand, 1995). 
Although there are multiple potential sources of misalignment between “an institutional 
arrangement… [and] the interests and needs of its participants,” (Seo and Creed, 2002: 232), we 
focus on the common case of organized interest groups that perceive themselves to be 
disadvantaged by the distributional consequences of an emergent institution. 
In contrast to the rational choice orientation that often characterizes interest group models 
of policymaking, we emphasize the effects of cognitive limitations and social influences on the 
policymaking process. The strategies that organized interest groups pursue to instigate change in 
emergent institutions reflect both political actors’ ability to consider only a limited range of 
issues (Kingdon, 1984)2 and constituents’ reliance on heuristics and pre-existing beliefs and 
biases (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986; McFarland, 1991; 
Zajac, 1995) to process the limited information available to them. Because the organized interest 
groups seeking change are often insufficiently powerful on their own to move the issue of 
change onto the limited policymaking agenda of cognitively constrained political actors facing 
multiple demands for legislative action (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Kingdon, 1984), they 
attempt to enlist the support of a broad range of interest groups that together are capable of 
capturing policymakers’ attention (Baumgartner, 2002; Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002; 
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Denzau and Munger, 1986). These groups include other organized interest groups and diffuse, 
unorganized groups, whose members are either marginally affected or unaffected by the 
emergent institution, hereafter referred to as secondary groups. 
In order to mobilize such groups, the organized interest groups seeking change attempt to 
influence the secondary groups’ normative evaluation of the emergent institution. The secondary 
groups typically have not yet evaluated the emergent institutions themselves: the costs of doing 
so are high because an emergent institution’s structures, processes and consequences are 
unknown and complex, and typically fail to justify the individual benefits of purposive 
evaluation available to cognitively limited members of diffuse groups (Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 
1971) or organized groups with their own focal issue.   
A primary strategy used by the organized interest groups seeking change is thus to exploit 
this perceptual vacuum by attempting to “frame” (Benford and Snow, 2000) the emergent 
institution as conflicting with pre-existing “cultural preoccupations and political biases” 
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988: 63; McFarland, 1991) in order to demonstrate its illegitimacy and 
thereby enfranchise the unaffected groups. The specific means by which they do so is to draw 
comparisons between the observable outcomes produced by the allegedly illegitimate emergent 
institution and those of established institutions whose legitimacy is not in question. Shocks or 
changes in circumstance and investors’ own business practices may facilitate these efforts by 
producing distributional outcomes that the groups seeking change may portray as morally 
suspect and therefore as additional evidence of the emergent institution’s illegitimacy.  
Upper-level political institutions that create checks and balances in the policymaking 
process as well as specific characteristics of the investing organizations themselves may both 
moderate pressures for change. In countries where formal political structures include multiple 
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checks and balances, change in an emergent institution can occur only when there exists 
agreement among multiple political actors representing non-overlapping interests. Systems 
characterized by greater formal checks and balances and heterogeneity of interest group 
pressures promote a status quo bias in policy that raises the threshold level of pressure any one  
interest group must be able to exert in order to effect change in an emergent institution (Tiller 
and Spiller, 1999; Tsebelis, 2003). Moreover, even when such change does result from the 
formal policymaking process, investors may still be able to isolate themselves from its effects by 
lobbying pivotal political actors. Their efforts are more likely to be successful when they have 
negotiated ex ante an emergent institution that balances long-run profitability with legitimacy 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996) or possess distinctive knowledge of and capabilities to influence the 
policymaking process in the host country (Barney, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; 
Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984).  
In the discussion that follows, we elaborate on these ideas to build toward a model of 
change in emergent institutions. Figure 1 summarizes the model. An emergent institution’s lack 
of a cognitive or moral basis for legitimacy and dearth of vested interests render it susceptible to 
efforts to overturn, modify or reinterpret it. Organized interest groups that perceive the emergent 
institution to inflict substantial distributional losses on them exploit this susceptibility by 
publicly questioning the emergent institution’s moral basis for legitimacy. They do so by 
creating interpretive frames for the broader polity and publicizing outcomes or other attributes of 
the emergent institution that appear to be inconsistent with those of established institutions 
representing prevailing notions of legitimacy. Exogenous shocks and investor business practices 
may provide additional fodder for these efforts. Political actors are more likely to respond to 
pressure for change if the supporting coalition is broad enough. However, formal political 
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structures that create checks and balances, as well as organizational linkages and distinctive 
knowledge, may reduce political actors’ sensitivity to such pressure.  
Illustration of Electricity Generation 
We illustrate our arguments with detailed evidence on the experience of foreign investors 
in electricity generation as well as examples drawn from other sectors. Private investment in 
electricity generation is an apt focal setting for illustrating our propositions because it is 
characterized by substantial conflict between the interests of political actors and investors as a 
result of large up-front capital costs, a long payback period, and susceptibility to claims of 
monopoly abuses (Levy and Spiller, 1994). However, because electricity generation represents 
what is perhaps an extreme case, we also provide several examples from industries that differ 
from electricity generation on at least one of these dimensions. 
For much of the 20th century, virtually every country embraced a norm of government 
ownership of electricity systems through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which provided 
political actors with a means of pursuing specific distributional objectives. SOEs’ construction of 
“white elephants”—large projects with questionable economic justification—promoted both 
equal access to electricity (Soto, 1999) and full employment (Savedoff and Spiller, 1999; World 
Bank, 1995). Retail pricing schedules further served to subsidize politically powerful classes of 
consumers, and nominal price freezes during inflationary periods mitigated the regressive effects 
of high inflation (Baer and McDonald, 1998; Bastos and Abdala, 1993; Soto, 1999). Similarly 
mixed public and private objectives influenced managers at state-owned enterprises in other 
sectors as well (Bertero and Rondi, 2000; Bourbakri and Cosset, 1997; Dewenter and Malatesta, 
1997; D'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh, 1994; 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1998; Vining and Boardman, 1989; Willig, 1994). 
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By 1990, the system of public ownership in many developing country markets had begun 
to collapse under its own weight, threatening macroeconomic stability and growth. Years of 
revenue shortfalls and cost overruns had forestalled economically necessary new construction 
and led to poor maintenance of existing facilities (International Energy Agency, 1999). In 
addition, fuel price increases, the collapse of the communist bloc, and unprecedented demand 
growth from the so-called East Asian miracle had combined to create a need for over $100 
billion of new capacity, bringing the pattern of decline to a head. The ultimate result was sharply 
reduced service reliability, and in some cases an outright power crisis including voltage 
reductions, usage restrictions, brownouts and blackouts. Governments thus turned to 
privatization in large part because they did not possess the capital to solve their mounting 
problems within the existing system of government ownership (Bortolotti, Fantini, and 
Siniscalco, 2000). A growing belief in privatization among international policy elites further 
bolstered the trend, particularly in industrialized nations (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
The potential for emergent institutions to be perceived as illegitimate under these 
circumstances was acute. The very notion of private infrastructure ownership itself—regardless 
of the specific emergent institutions—often conflicted with longstanding norms. Even though 
many citizens and organized interest groups in countries suffering from power shortages likely 
embraced the notion of reform in general, virtually all had spent their lives in a world where 
government ownership of critical infrastructure was a rarely questioned fact; they not only 
accepted but expected the politicized pricing, output and sourcing decisions associated with 
government ownership. Indeed, political actors—with the assistance of multilateral agencies, 
international financial institutions and international investors—in many cases mounted public 
relations campaigns to convince citizens of the need to shift from government to private 
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ownership in the first place. At a minimum, then, the emergent institutions of private ownership 
did not possess a ready basis for attaining morally-based legitimacy at the time of transition; the 
possibility of change created heightened political risk for foreign investors. 
BACKROUND INFLUENCES 
The traditional bargaining power model posits that an initial bargain struck between the 
government and foreign investors becomes less resistant to change as investor bargaining power 
declines over time. In contrast, our analysis suggests that it is the very youth of the emergent 
institution embodying such a bargain that renders it especially susceptible to change.  
Lack of Legitimacy 
The defining characteristic of an emergent institution—and its main point of contrast with 
an established institution—is its lack of widespread, implicit acceptance. Established institutions 
have been “retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization” (Berger and Luckman, 
1967: 60-61) and consequently possess “a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the 
individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Once they enter their 
mature phase, established institutions “do not just constrain options: they establish the very 
criteria by which people discover their preferences” (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991: 11). 
Actors in a society do not even attempt to evaluate an established institution that is 
subject to this level of taken-for-grantedness; the institution is legitimate by assumption. Studies 
undertaken in such varied contexts as the adoption of civil service reform by U.S. cities (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983), the spread of the multidivisional form among large firms (Fligstein, 1985) 
and the diffusion of total quality management among hospitals (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 
1997) all provide evidence that a presumption of legitimacy can trump “cost-benefit” 
calculations. Indeed, “taken-for-grantedness represents the most subtle and the most powerful 
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source of legitimacy identified to date” (Suchman, 1995: 583). Legitimacy imbues an established 
institution with high resistance to change (Zucker, 1977); its very “essence” is one of 
“permanence” (Suchman, 1995: 584). 
An emergent institution is incapable of attaining legitimacy on such cognitive grounds 
(Suchman, 1995: 582) because the conferring social process of is a lengthy one. However, actors 
in society may still make a “positive normative evaluation” of an emergent institution’s 
consequences, procedures or structural type (Suchman, 1995: 579-81). Such an evaluation 
provides a “moral” basis for legitimacy; once made, it too provides the basis for a “generalized 
perception or assumption” supporting the propriety of the emergent institution’s conduct, which 
in turn reduces the emergent institution’s susceptibility to attack by those opposed to it. 
Given the availability of a moral basis for legitimacy, political actors seeking to maintain 
future support presumably face an incentive to design emergent institutions that invite a positive 
normative evaluation, for example, through isomorphism with established institutions whose 
legitimacy is taken for granted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Faced with a pressing economic or 
social need that threatens their short-term survival, however, political actors may discount the 
future heavily and instead seek the most expeditious solution without regard for its sustainability. 
Their cognitive limitations (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), expectation that they will no longer be 
in power when distributional consequences come to light (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Bornefalk, 
1998; Landes and Posner, 1975; Olson, 1993) or perception that they may have subsequent 
opportunities to modify the emergent institution (North and Weingast, 1989) may all contribute 
to political actors’ heavy discounting. Organized interest groups’ increased willingness to defer 
(Williamson, 1993) or compromise when the costs of delayed resolution is high (Alesina and 
Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli, 1993)—possibly compounded by their shifting influence 
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following a crisis (Nelson, 1990) or their uncertainty about post-crisis outcomes (Fernandez and 
Rodrik, 1991)—further contribute to the possibility that an emergent institution will not be 
designed for the ready attainment of legitimacy on a moral basis. 
Dearth of Vested Interests 
An established institution enjoys the support of interest groups that benefit from it and 
fight for its survival. While emergent institutions also initially benefit from the support of certain 
interest groups, these groups may not be as numerous, well established, prestigious or rich in 
resources as are those with an interest in the status quo. For example, Jaffee and Freeman (2002) 
document a case in which established, prestigious law firms in Germany blocked an initiative to 
introduce employee stock plans that had the support of newer venture capital firms and the 
rapidly growing high technology sector, both of which would have gained business and status 
from passage of the initiative. More generally, the most vigorous defenders of an emergent 
institution may well be foreign investors themselves, who have no direct voice in the electoral 
process and are susceptible to nationalist rhetoric (Kobrin, 1987) that casts doubt on any claims 
of legitimacy that they might make. 
As an emergent institution matures, new groups of entrepreneurial actors devise means 
through which to benefit from it and therefore “fight any attempt to reverse it” (Rodrik, 1994: 
82). In Rodrik’s focal context of trade liberalization, for example, “outward-oriented policies 
generate new profit opportunities for entrepreneurs… As new, previously unpredictable export 
activities appear, a new class of export-oriented businessmen is created” (Rodrik, 1994: 82). 
Furthermore, the emergent institution later develops the support of an entrenched bureaucracy, 
whose members take actions such as hiring likeminded individuals, mounting campaigns for 
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autonomy from political oversight, and providing increased voice for interest groups benefiting 
from the emergent institution (Downs, 1966), bolstering its resistance to change. 
Proposition 
Regardless of the differences in legitimacy and vested interest group support between 
emergent and established institutions, both types of entities are always the subject of demands 
for change by the organized interest groups that they most adversely affect. In the case of an 
emergent institution, these groups may become more vocal once the need that precipitated 
construction of the emergent institution is resolved (Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi, 
1996). In the context of the policymaking process, however, the primary significance of the 
background differences between emergent and established institutions is the greater opportunity 
that the organized interest groups seeking change have in the former case to mobilize the support 
of secondary groups (Leblebici et al., 1991). 
Proposition 1. An emergent institution’s susceptibility to pressures for change is 
greatest early in its life and declines with time. 
Illustration 
A comparison of the treatment received by private investors in the Chilean and Argentine 
electricity generation sector illustrates the differential risk that investors face as a result of 
differences in legitimacy between established and emergent institutions. Chile was a pioneer in 
privatizing its electricity sector during the Pinochet regime starting in the mid-1970s (Estache 
and Rodrigues-Pardina, 1998; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Philippi, 1991; Spiller and Martorell, 
1996). Although the market principles underlying the reforms originally engendered some public 
discord, debate eventually shifted away from core principles to focus on the regulatory apparatus 
itself. During the subsequent 30 years, members of Chilean society were socialized under the 
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declared principle that “the state should only assume direct responsibility for those functions 
which the [people] … are unable to deal with adequately” (Edwards and Edwards, 1991:93) and 
witnessed multiple sector-level reforms that increased the legitimacy of market principles. As a 
result of its strong public support, the Chilean system has been fairly robust to change, and for 
most of its history prices have “moved almost independently of politics” (Spiller and Martorell, 
1996:119-21), with one notable exception following a 100-year drought in 1998. 
Like the Chilean system, the Argentine system adopted in 1992 was part of a broad 
reform package intended to reshape the economy in accordance with more market-oriented 
principles; in fact, it is reputed to have been modeled largely after the Chilean system (Lalor and 
Garcia, 1996). Both share at their core a mathematical, apolitical formula to set prices. Some 
observers thus initially believed that Argentina’s system would function similarly to the Chilean 
one, characterizing the electricity market as “relatively unregulated where producers can charge 
what the market will bear” (Green, McWilliams, and Pearson, 1995). However, within several 
years of the system’s introduction, the Argentine government engaged in heavy-handed political 
intervention (Bastos and Abdala, 1993; Estache and Rodrigues-Pardina, 1998). Part of the public 
sentiment underlying this response was the “general sense of injustice” (Lapper, 2002) that 
Argentineans feel toward many government-sponsored reforms, which they believe “do not 
reflect society’s point of view” [Ibid.]. The Argentine system has thus increasingly shifted away 
from “merit” dispatch under which generators choose whether or not to produce based on the 
government’s offer price to “forced” dispatch under which generators are obligated to produce. 
More generally, investors in Chile have greater confidence that policies of deregulation, 
liberalization and market-oriented reform will succeed as a result of their attainment of 
legitimacy, in contrast to their counterparts in other Latin American countries. The lessons that 
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Starr (2002) draws regarding competition policy in much of Latin America are apposite: 
competition policy reform “takes years to develop. Much time is required to build institution—to 
win legislative support for autonomous and well-funded competition agencies, to train staff, to 
change entrenched behavioral patterns in established agencies, and then to modernize the 
judiciary and build public support… Simply put, competition policy runs counter to decades of 
accepted behaviors” (Starr, 2002). 
MECHANISMS OF CHANGE IN EMERGENT INSTITUTIONS 
While emergent institutions are relatively susceptible to change, change actually occurs 
only through the efforts of “change agents,” in this case, organized interest groups that are 
dissatisfied with the distributional outcomes that an emergent institution inflicts on them 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Sjöstrand, 1995). An 
important challenge that such groups typically face is the mobilization of a broad enough 
coalition to move the issue of change onto the limited policymaking agenda (Baumgartner, 2002; 
Baumgartner and Mahoney, 2002; Denzau and Munger, 1986; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; 
Kingdon, 1984). The pivotal role of such a coalition underscores the multilateral nature of the 
investor’s bargain; this stands in contrast to the traditional bargaining power perspective, which 
treats the investor’s bargain as a strictly bilateral one with “the government.” The organized 
interest groups seeking change exploit potential coalition members’ agnosticism about the 
emergent institution by offering evidence that supports a negative normative assessment, which 
provides a moral basis for a judgment of illegitimacy. 
Framing and Reference Points 
One mechanism that the organized interest groups seeking change use to mobilize 
unaffected groups is a “collective action frame” (Benford and Snow, 2000) that facilitates 
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negative interpretation of this new and largely unknown entity according to pre-existing beliefs 
and biases, for example, the “right” of citizens to control their country’s critical resources or 
their “entitlement” to certain services. Research in social movement theory has examined the use 
of such frames in varied contexts, for example, national competitiveness frames used by interest 
groups seeking to influence standards for high definition television (Dowell, Swaminathan, and 
Wade, 2002) and environmental justice frames in recycling policy (Lounsbury, Ventresca, and 
Hirsch, 2003).  
A complementary mechanism for demonstrating an emergent institution’s illegitimacy is 
to contrast its attributes with those of various reference points that reflect a prevailing standard of 
legitimacy (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982). Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) 
advance this notion in the context of consumer and labor market transactions between 
individuals and private firms. They provide empirical evidence that individuals assess the 
“fairness” of the prices or wages set by a firm with which they have not previously transacted by 
comparing them to a prevailing price or wage level—a “reference transaction”—whose fairness 
is not itself in question. In the social movement context, Minkoff (1997) effectively argues that 
the civil rights movement served as reference point for the feminist movement. 
Zajac (1995) develops this insight in a political-economic context, focusing especially on 
US utility regulation. He contends that a normative principle of fairness requiring “like treatment 
of like cases” is “deeply ingrained” in many (“perhaps most”) societies. Furthermore, 
“institutional framing”—whereby “the economic environment, operative institutions and 
history… give specific meaning…” to the fairness principle—determines “how and under what 
circumstances [this principle] will be applied” (Zajac, 1995).3 
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The most compelling comparisons that disaffected interest groups draw in their coalition-
building efforts may be between their own or other groups’ pre- and post-reform income, as well 
as between their own or other groups’ post-reform income and that of foreign investors. The 
larger the discrepancies that such comparisons reveal, the greater is the prospect that organized 
interest groups will be able to convince others of the emergent institution’s lack of legitimacy. 
More generally, an emergent institution in one sector whose consequences, procedures or 
structural type are different from those of institutions governing other sectors, or that is adopted 
in isolation rather than as part of a broader “package” of linked, consistent reforms, is more 
susceptible to change than is an emergent institution that resembles established institutions or is 
adopted as part of a broader package of reforms. Furthermore, whereas emergent institutions 
adopted as part of a package are relatively difficult to unravel politically (Martinelli and 
Tommasi, 1997; Tollison and Willett, 1979), the singular nature of an emergent institution 
adopted in isolation—in response to a sector level crisis, for example—provides organized 
interest groups with a ready “prognostic frame” for solving the problem of illegitimacy: the 
elimination of the offending entity itself. 
Proposition 2a. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an 
emergent institution grows with the degree of divergence between the emergent 
institution and reference points whose legitimacy is not in question. 
The crisis conditions under which electricity privatization occurred in many countries set 
the stage for institutional design efforts that were inconsistent with observable reference points 
and provided a ripe basis for invoking various frames challenging the existence of emergent 
institutions. A case in point is the policy that some governments adopted of offering bilateral 
“power purchase agreements” (PPAs) that granted highly favorable terms to private investors, 
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typically in the absence of broader market rules. These contracts were unique in that private 
investors bore practically no risk (other than penalties for failing to begin operations by a 
specified date and the operating risk itself) but retained all of the upside potential.  
An alternative emergent institution that provided for greater legitimacy in some cases was 
a set of sector-level market rules. These rules benefited investors by explicitly limiting the scope 
of government intervention. However, by mirroring the structure of other markets in the 
economy, they reduced the ability of interest groups of political entrepreneurs to cast them as 
special deals deserving of reevaluation.  
Evidence that managers recognize the importance of consistency comes from the 
microprocessor industry, which is characterized by substantial capital costs but less political 
salience than electricity generation is. In its negotiations with various governments during the 
site selection process for a $500m semiconductor plant that was eventually located in Costa Rica, 
Intel stressed that any concessions that it secured should be generally available to all firms 
making an investment of equal size, lest it be singled out as a recipient of special treatment and 
made the target of a populist backlash. Concessions to work around legal requirements for 
unionization actually eliminated Mexico from the running. Costa Rica, in contrast, altered its 
original proposal to comply with Intel’s demand for consistency (Spar, 1998).  
Exogenous Changes in Circumstance and Change in Emergent Institutions 
In addition to exploiting existing reference points, organized interest groups seeking to 
change an emergent institution may also take advantage of exogenous shocks or changes in 
circumstance that increase the magnitude, scope or salience of the emergent institution’s 
distributional consequences (March and Simon, 1958). Such “focusing events” (Kingdon, 1984: 
106) often provide powerful images that constitute perhaps the most striking reference points of 
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all. Organized interest groups seeking change may use these events to enfranchise groups that 
did not previously regard change in the emergent institution as a salient political issue (Hoffman, 
1999; Seo and Creed, 2002), and also to enhance the cohesion of their coalition by constructing 
an injustice frame (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982) based on the contrast between the losses 
incurred by “victims” and the relative well-being of investors insulated by the emergent 
institution. They may further bolster the perception of injustice by pointing to the relative lack of 
public debate about the design of the emergent institution at the time of the threat or crisis that 
precipitated it (Kogut and Spicer, 2002; Mlcoch, 1998). 
Other actors may assist organized interest groups in their campaign for change following 
an exogenous shock or change in circumstance. “Political entrepreneurs” including incumbent 
politicians, opposition politicians and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may exploit the 
event in order to boost their own popular support (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Jones, 1978; 
Schneider and Teske, 1992), especially during elections or other periods of political contention. 
McFarland’s cyclical theory of interest group politics (1991) as well as the broader 
macroeconomic literature on political business cycles, which emphasizes how political actors 
may opportunistically manipulate policy levers under their control for the purpose of electoral 
gain (Alesina, 1989; Nordhaus, 1975; Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), are both illustrative. Media 
organizations with their own political agendas may play a role as well, especially in 
enfranchising diffuse, previously unorganized groups (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Weingast, 1981). 
Moreover, “new” groups whose members control inputs whose scarcity has increased following 
a disruptive event (Landes, 1998; North, 1990), or are better able to process and exploit new 
information than are the members of groups whose routines are adapted to prior circumstances 
(Ingram, 1998), may also join the coalition supporting change. At the same time, members of the 
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original coalition supporting the emergent institution are more likely to defer or compromise if 
the cost of delayed resolution is high and change in the emergent institution—including its 
elimination—appears to be an expedient solution (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Drazen and Grilli, 
1993; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Nelson, 1990; Williamson, 1993).     
The presence of contrasting reference points, entrepreneurial political actors who seize 
upon them and newly enfranchised interest groups all significantly improve the ability of 
organized interest groups seeking change in an emergent institution to obtain such change. 
Indeed, the conditions that an exogenous shock or change in circumstance creates may play the 
pivotal role in determining whether such a group is able to secure major (or punctuated) change 
rather than incremental (or creeping) change, which is more common in the policymaking arena 
(Astley, 1985; Jones, Baumgartner, and True, 1998; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).  
Proposition 2b. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an 
emergent institution is higher after an exogenous shock or change in circumstance.  
One prominent example of an exogenous shock is a macroeconomic crisis. Argentina 
again provides an example: after the 2001-02 financial crisis there, President Duhalde, clearly 
attempting to bolster political support for himself, cited the extraordinary profits earned by 
foreign infrastructure investors as justification for the imposition of a retroactive emergency 
profits tax (Esterl, 2002). The 1997 East Asian financial crisis provides another example. 
Citizens and interest groups in these countries, which were already experiencing social and 
political strife as a result of the severe economic downturn, perceived PPAs that obligated cash-
strapped government entities to pay private generators for unneeded electricity as illegitimate. 
Street demonstrations, riots and even, in the case of Indonesia, the revolution that overthrew 
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President Suharto were a direct or indirect reaction—often instigated by political 
entrepreneurs—to government attempts to honor the terms of PPAs.  
Electricity investors have not been alone in facing pressure for change in the emergent 
institutions that govern their relationship with the host government. Investors in the 
telecommunications, automotive, natural resource and financial sectors have also suffered similar 
calls to “share the pain” during the recent Argentine crisis and the ongoing economic turmoil in 
Bolivia, Venezuela and Peru.  
Investor Business Practices and Change in Emergent Institutions 
The foregoing propositions suggest that in addition to the traditional bargaining power 
model’s emphasis on the ex ante conditions under which a bargain is struck, the play of the ex 
post execution phase is a critical determinant of the level of political risk that an investor faces. 
Not only do the specific attributes and outcomes of the emergent institution influence the 
perception of legitimacy during this phase, but so too may the behavior of investors.  
All foreign investors’ business practices are subject to public scrutiny. Decisions to lay 
workers off, or otherwise increase profits at the expense of suppliers, consumers or the 
government are easily identified and taken out of context; in some cases, they provide images as 
dramatic as those that major shocks and crises do (Guillén, 2000). Organized interest groups 
seeking change may tie such factors to injustice frames that they have developed to mobilize 
support. For example, in order to reinforce local stereotypes regarding neocolonial exploitation 
by private interests, such groups may point to business practices that transfer rents from local 
interests to foreign shareholders. Even when such actions are “efficient” or in the long-term 
interest of the host country, they may still facilitate the formation of injustice frames. 
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Consider some of the specific practices that the traditional bargaining power literature 
recommends to protect infrastructure investors from political risk (Moran, 2000; Wells and 
Gleason, 1995). One such practice is the substitution of debt for equity, which reduces an 
investor’s financial exposure. However, this practice also raises a project’s rate of return, which 
can be framed as prima facie evidence of inequity. Similarly, the front-loading of risk through 
high “required” returns in the early years of a project’s operation may increase the probability  
that investors will recoup their investment, but may also produce higher service prices that can 
be labeled as “exploitative.” Other practices include the use of foreign partners to spread risk, 
which may feed the perception that a project is not “local” enough; and the use of government 
guarantees or commitments to pursue international arbitration, which may be characterized as 
“special treatment.” More routine practices such as laying off excess labor or soliciting 
competitive bids from foreign as well as local input suppliers also make effective targets. 
Proposition 2c. The probability that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an 
emergent institution is higher when investors undertake new business practices that raise 
the project’s rate of return at the expense of powerful local interest groups. 
One example of nominally routine business practices’ generating pressure for change 
comes from Brazil. Support for the privatization program there waned substantially after a 
blackout in Sao Paulo during the Christmas holiday in 1997. Record heat and a poor pre-
privatization maintenance history were certainly contributing factors, but the press and the public 
focused largely on the 40 percent reduction in personnel (some of whom had to be rehired to 
teach existing workers how to repair jury-rigged transformers), as well as the utility’s record 
profits and weak regulatory supervision (Moffett, 1998). In Buenos Aires, customers who had 
been without power for almost a week of high temperatures following a fire at a power station 
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operated by the Chilean firm Edesur marched in the streets nightly banging pots and pans and 
setting tires and an automobile on fire (Zadunaisky, 1999). An engineer interviewed by the news 
media claimed that the delay in reinstating power was caused by Edesur’s laying off of 
thousands of skilled Argentine workers like himself (Valente, 1999).  
Even business practices that foreign investors undertake to enhance the strength of the 
interest group coalition favoring the emergent institutions may later create pressure for change 
following an exogenous change in circumstances. Investors in Malaysia and Indonesia, for 
example, took on host country partners with privileged political access, as recommended by the 
traditional bargaining power literature. This practice does not appear to redistribute returns away 
from local interests in any way; in fact, it might well be perceived as “spreading the wealth” 
from a successful project. Following the 1997 financial crisis, however, electricity investors in 
Indonesia, where the pre-crisis Suharto government had fallen, were labeled as corrupt on the 
basis of their ties to the government. In contrast, those who were closely linked through local 
partners to the surviving Matathir government in Malaysia benefited from their ties.  
Another example from a capital-intensive but less politically salient sector involves the 
airport construction and services industry, where Fraport recently wrote off its investment in the 
new terminal at Manila airport. The German company formed an equity partnership with a 
prominent local Chinese family and allegedly made substantial payments to cronies of former 
President Estrada. However, his successor, President Arroyo, made rooting out corrupt dealings 
the touchstone of her administration. After challenging 28 specific terms of the contract, she 
declared the contract null and void, leaving Fraport with a loss of $318m (Landler, 2003). 
INSTITUTIONAL MODERATORS 
As discussed in the previous section, the magnitude and scope of interest group pressures 
for change in emergent institutions must attain some “threshold” level in order for such change 
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to appear on the policymaking agenda because political actors are a capable of considering a 
limited number of issues at any one time. Given this limitation, political actors choose issues to 
address based not only on the political benefits that they will enjoy from “solving” an issue 
through policymaking, but also the “cost” that they must incur in terms of the time and effort that 
such policymaking requires. This cost depends largely on the configuration of the country-level 
institutions—most prominently the internal structures of and relationships among the legislature, 
the executive branch, the judiciary and regulatory agencies—that govern the policymaking 
process itself (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996; Moe and Caldwell, 1994). Configurations 
that increase costs impede change, effectively mitigating interest group pressures for change 
(Tiller and Spiller, 1999; Tsebelis, 2003), while structures that reduce costs facilitate change, 
effectively increasing the potency of such pressures. The neoinstitutional perspective thus 
augments the traditional bargaining power model’s list of country-level determinants of 
“renegotiation” by incorporating the institutional configuration of policymaking as a determinant 
of the “threshold” level of interest group pressure needed to generate change in emergent 
institutions. 
Analysis of the effects of country-level institutional configurations on the incidence of 
policy change derives from the regulative pillar of neoinstitutional theory, including 
contributions from economic history (North, 1990; North and Weingast, 1989); formal political 
economy models (Dixit, 1996; Laffont, 1999); and qualitative evidence from recent policy shifts 
in infrastructure sectors (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Spiller, 1993) and elsewhere (Gely and Spiller, 
1990; Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast, 1989; McNollGast, 1987; Weingast and Moran, 1983). 
Such institutions are usefully characterized in terms of checks and balances, including both de 
jure characteristics such as constitutional separation of powers as well as de facto characteristics 
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such as the extent of partisan heterogeneity within and across branches of government. 
Institutional configurations with stronger checks and balances require agreement across a 
broader range of political actors to effect a shift in policy, increasing the effort required of any 
given political actor to change an emergent institution. In contrast, configurations that 
concentrate political power in the hands of a single actor facilitate. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates the effects of institutional veto points on policy stability (Franzese Jr., 1999; 
Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Treisman, 2000b). 
For investors assessing the institutional configuration governing the policymaking 
process in a given country, recognition of the interplay among different governmental bodies is 
particularly important. For example, a veto point that constrains executive discretion on a 
constitutional basis, such as an independent legislature, may be entirely controlled by the 
executive’s party (Henisz, 2000), effectively negating the constitutional separation of powers. 
MacIntyre (2001) provides illustrative evidence from Malaysia at the time of the 1997 Southeast 
Asian Financial Crisis: the Parliament there appeared to have a fragmented party structure which 
would have impeded a rapid response, but in fact the government party controlled many of the 
ostensibly independent parties, generating a homogeneous preference structure and facilitating a 
rapid set of changes. Even when partisan preferences in a legislative chamber are truly 
heterogeneous, the collective nature of the body may well mean that partisan checks and 
balances are less effective than are those provided by freestanding institutional actors such as 
regulatory agencies or judiciaries (Crepaz, 1998; 2002). Even these latter sorts of checks and 
balances must be scrutinized, however. For example, a regulatory agency or sub-federal entity 
that is not monitored or constrained by other governmental bodies is prone to corruption and 
overspending (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000; de Mello Jr., 2000; Rodden, 2002; Treisman, 
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2000a; Wibbels, 2000) and likely to be more susceptible to interest group pressures for 
“reinterpretation” of an emergent institution.  
Proposition 3. Given some level of  interest group pressure for change, the stronger the 
effective checks and balances in the policymaking process, the lower the probability that 
political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an emergent institution. 
An example of the effect of country-level institutional veto points on change in emergent 
institutions is the differential government treatment of private electricity investors in Thailand 
and the Philippines relative to that of investors in Indonesia and Malaysia following the 1997 
financial crisis. At the time of the crisis, the Parliamentary majority in the Thai legislature was 
divided among 10 parties and the Philippine government faced a razor-thin legislative majority 
that relied on the support of independents and other allies in both chambers. This 
fractionalization of preferences ensured that any new policy proposal or change in the status quo 
policy required the approval of multiple parties with their own competing interests. 
The country-level institutions in Malaysia and Indonesia looked quite different. Dr. 
Mahathir, Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time of the crisis, and President Suharto of 
Indonesia effectively controlled the political systems of their respective countries using the 
overwhelming majority of National Front Coalition in the former case and the Golkar Party in 
the latter. In neither country was the judiciary considered independent. 
Investors in Thailand and the Philippines, with their stronger institutional safeguards, 
fared relatively well following the crisis. The Thai government absorbed some of the exchange 
rate risk held by investors and the Philippine government upheld private investors’ PPAs despite 
the fact that this policy adversely affected the state-owned electricity company NAPOCOR. 
Electricity investors in Malaysia and Indonesia experienced much less favorable treatment once 
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the financial crisis began. In 1997, the Malaysian government announced the suspension of its 
largest IPP contract (the 2,400 Bakun hydroelectric project) and demanded substantial 
concessions from the remaining IPPs (Global Power Report, 1998). In Indonesia, the government 
announced in September 1997 that it would postpone or review infrastructure projects worth a 
total of more than 50 trillion rupiah (US $6 billion) and six months later sent a letter to its IPPs 
informing them that subsequent compensation would be less than one-quarter of the contracted 
rate (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1998).  
As the burgeoning literature on veto players summarized on pp. 26-28 also suggests, not 
all federal systems include both the power of the states to check the center and the power of the 
center to constrain the states. Instead, states or provinces often exist as sources of unchecked 
political power. Brazil provides an example in the form of a dispute between Itamar Franco, the 
former President of Brazil and newly-elected provincial governor of Minas Gerais; and Southern 
Corporation and AES, which together purchased the local utility CEMIG in 1997. The inability 
of the national government to check the arbitrary, populist actions of Franco in a dispute 
regarding the corporate governance of CEMIG was a primary factor in the decision by Duke and 
AES to suspend their participation in an auction for the state utility Cesp Tiete later that year. 
Another country-level institutional relationship that moderates the behavior of political 
actors is the relationship between the regulator and the upper branches of government, in 
particular, the extent to which a regulator is able to check the behavior of political actors in these 
branches and vice-versa. Where the regulatory authority lacks autonomy, it cannot serve as an 
effective check on policymakers motivated to promote unfavorable policies toward investors. 
The Hungarian experience is a case in point. Numerous design features limit the Hungarian 
Energy Office’s (HEO) independence (Newbery, 1998; Stern, 2000). Incidents such as a 
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ministry-mandated reduction in the real price of electricity during the run-up to the 2002 
election—in opposition to the HEO’s recommendation—illustrate the fragility of emergent 
institutions in the absence of sufficient checks and balances. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
To what extent do individual organizations differ in the level of political risk that they 
face? The traditional bargaining power perspective links an organization’s size, export potential 
and technology to the rate at which its bargaining power declines, and thus the likelihood that it 
will be subject to adverse treatment by the government (Kobrin, 1987). In contrast to this 
“invariably passive and conforming” (Oliver, 1991: 146) depiction, in which the organization 
simply “responds” to the government’s altered demands, neoinstitutional theories suggest 
mechanisms through which organizations may exploit their distinctive institutional traits ex post 
to engage in “interest-seeking, active… behavior” [Ibid.] aimed at insulating themselves from 
change in emergent institutions. The more active depiction of the organization under this 
conception provides a considerably stronger basis on which to build a theory of strategy.  
Organizations confronting the risk or reality of adverse change in emergent institutions 
confront strong pressures to maintain legitimacy by acquiescing to such change (Oliver, 
1991:160-161). Because the enforcement mechanism for emergent institutions is the coercive 
power of the state (Scott, 2001: 52), the penalties for noncompliance are both tangible and severe 
(Oliver, 1991:168). At the same time, the imposition of a new or modified institution intended to 
meet broader distributional demands significantly restricts an organization’s discretion in key 
decisions such as “resource allocation, product or service selection, resource acquisition or 
organizational administration (i.e., hiring, compensation, promotion)” (Oliver, 1991: 166), and 
more generally chafes against the “technical activities and efficiency demands” (Seo and Creed, 
2002:226) that support profitability. The prospect of substantial economic loss from conformity 
31 
to the external mandates of the state thus creates strong internal pressures for organizations to 
resist change in emergent institutions.  
Specific characteristics of an organization affect its ability to resist change. One 
characteristic is the organization’s interorganizational linkages. Although these are typically 
viewed as determining the diffusion or adoption of new organizational forms (Marsden and 
Friedkin, 1993), they are significant in the current context in the degree to which they provide an 
organization with channels into the policymaking process. Strong direct or indirect ties to 
relevant political actors—especially those who control resources sought by an organization—
permit organizations to craft “side deals” with these actors for special contract terms or 
individualized exceptions to adverse changes in emergent institutions. Organizations lacking 
such ties are at a distinct disadvantage, not only because they cannot exploit the ties for 
defensive purposes during a period of flux, but also because a well-connected competitor’s gain 
during a period of upheaval may have a direct adverse impact on them.  
A second characteristic is an organization’s information-based resources and capabilities 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Given the difficulty of assessing complex, evolving emergent 
institutions, managers who can look to their own past experience for an analogue to guide their 
current search for an organizational response or for accumulated learning (Baum and Ingram, 
1998; Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000) are better equipped to make sound decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty. Henisz and Delios (2001), for example, find that prior experience in a specific 
host country reduces an organization’s sensitivity to cultural or market differences. Lyles and 
Steensma argue that as a result of the wide diversity of emergent institutions governing 
infrastructure projects, investors’ management of their relationship with the government is an 
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important organizational capability and key “factor of success” in such projects (Lyles and 
Steensma, 1996: 70).  
Proposition 4. Given some level of  interest group pressure for change, the use of 
appropriate organizational linkages and distinctive knowledge lowers the probability 
that political actors will overturn, alter or reinterpret an emergent institution 
The Czech Republic provides an example of the value of strong direct ties and the 
difficulties experienced by organizations that do not themselves possess such ties but whose 
competitors do. Oftentimes a “privileged” organization such as a long-standing incumbent, an 
SOE or its privatized progeny, or a national champion possesses the strongest ties to relevant 
political actors. In the Czech case, the government’s desire to secure a high sale price for CEZ, 
the previously state-owned monopoly generator, is widely believed to be responsible for the 
promulgation of a new schedule of allegedly inflated prices that independent private generators 
must pay to CEZ for “ancillary services” (Financial Times Business Limited, 2000).  
Indirect ties that may help moderate the organization-specific impact of change in 
emergent institutions include rating agencies, international banking syndicates, equity owners, 
government-sponsored political risk underwriters (e.g., OPIC, the Export-Import Bank, 
COFACE, ECGD, MITI etc.), multilateral lending agencies (e.g., the Asian Development Bank 
and the International Finance Corporation) and home country governments. Investors have 
different levels of access to these entities as a result of their size, extent and quality of historical 
interactions, past campaign contributions and the like.  
A prominent example of the manner in which an organization may employ such indirect 
ties in an attempt to alter a policy outcome involves Texas-based Enron Corporation’s 
investments in Argentina. A former regulatory official there (now a Congressmen) claims to 
33 
have received a phone call from George W. Bush (the son of then President-elect George H.W. 
Bush) that delivered “a subtle, vague message that [helping Enron] could help us with our 
relationship to the United States” (Corn, 2002). 
Evidence of the value of an organization’s experience profile in moderating adverse 
changes in emergent institutions comes from Holburn (2001), who finds evidence suggesting that 
organizations that have previously operated under rate-of-return regulation are better equipped to 
manage rate review, while organizations with experience in wholesale market competition are 
better able to manipulate prices under complex market rules. Similarly, organizations with 
experience in countries with centralized political decision-making or multiple checks and 
balances respectively enjoy a comparative advantage in other countries with similar attributes.  
Examples of firms from other industries whose competitive advantage appears linked to 
managing relations with the government abound, particularly in capital-intensive industries or 
those characterized by widespread consumption and a strong public interest. The two largest 
conglomerates in Hong Kong (Hutchison Whampoa Limited and First Pacific Limited) operate 
ports, telecommunication systems, electricity generators, retail chains and hotels in 36 primarily 
emerging markets. South Africa’s two largest cellular companies (MTN and Vodacom) offer 
service in Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Swaziland, Rwanda, Uganda  and 
Zimbabwe. Finally, the two largest Turkish construction firms (ENKA and STFA) manage 
projects in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyztan, Libya, Oman, Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, 
and Ukraine. It is doubtful that these firms rely primarily on technological innovation or 
marketing ability to drive their internationalization; instead, they have more likely developed the 
capability to operate in an idiosyncratic institutional context (Henisz, 2003). 
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CONCLUSION  
We have sought to augment the traditional bargaining power perspective by considering 
the institutional context in which bargains are struck and changed. In contrast to the traditional 
perspective’s depiction of bargaining as a one-shot deterministic interaction between an investor 
and a monolithic government, our model depicts an ongoing process in the policymaking arena 
consisting of interactions among investors, organized interest groups, citizens and political 
actors, all of whom face cognitive limitations; differ in their preferences; and are subject to 
varying normative pressures, institutional constraints and exogenous influences. Our approach 
thus broadens the traditional perspective’s focus on ex ante conditions by building toward a 
“recursive, iterative model of institutional change” that combines consideration of “top-down 
processes” allowing higher-level structures to shape “the structure and actions of lower-level 
actors” with that of “counterprocesses… [allowing] lower-level actors and structures [to] shape 
the contexts in which they operate” (Scott, 2001:196-197).  
The specific points of distinction between our expanded model and the traditional 
perspective are numerous. In our model, the bargain between government and investor assumes 
the form of an emergent institution rather than remain devoid of institutional content. A web of 
implicit contracts among political actors, interest groups and foreign investors substitutes for the 
bilateral dependency between investors and government. Legitimacy augments relative 
dependence as a determinant of change. Institutionalization replaces secular decline. Country-
level institutional structures and organization-level characteristics augment the traditionally 
acknowledged determinants of change  
Our expanded model also introduces core constructs that have no counterpart in the 
traditional perspective. “Events that matter” (Kobrin, 1979)—exogenous changes in 
circumstance or specific investor business practices—may be used illuminate misalignment 
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between the distributional rights enshrined in a prevailing regulative institution and various 
interest groups’ perception of legitimacy. “Environmental processes” (Kobrin, 1979) play a key 
role, especially that through which organized interest groups enfranchise secondary interest 
groups to exert pressure for change in emergent institutions. 
Strategic Implications 
The strategic implications of our model for foreign investors are numerous and complex, 
sometimes extending those from the traditional bargaining power perspective, sometimes at odds 
with them. The first set of recommendations relate to the process of risk assessment. We 
highlight the maturity of an emergent institution, its initial design process, its susceptibility to 
framing and degree of consistency with existing reference points, and the expected distribution 
and nature of environmental disturbances as crucial determinants of political risk. We also point 
to the national policymaking structures and an organization’s own internal capabilities as 
important determinants of political risk.  
In the context of risk management, the traditional perspective advises investors to exploit 
their strong initial bargaining power to secure the strongest ex ante safeguards possible, such as 
frontloading their returns. Our model suggests that investors exercise caution in exploiting their 
initial bargaining power by negotiating for emergent institutions that balance profitability with 
legitimacy, and are thus more resistant to interest group pressures for change. Similarly, whereas 
the traditional perspective advises investors to take ongoing measures such as protecting 
distinctive technology in order to maintain their bargaining power, our model suggests that 
investors should exercise caution in their attempts to maintain bargaining power, avoiding 
business practices whose actual or perceived distributional consequences may engender 
perceptions of illegitimacy of the supporting emergent institutions.  
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The recommendation of the traditional bargaining power literature to cultivate local allies 
is further enhanced by the legitimacy such partners may provide to emergent institutions when 
incentive alignment among the various partners can be maintained. On the other hand, when a 
host country partner is well situated to threaten both the economic interests and legitimacy of the 
emergent institutions supporting the foreign investor, the partnership strategy may itself be risky. 
Routines and capabilities to manage relationships with partners, interest groups and 
policymakers all emerge as important success factors. 
These findings also have strong implications for insurers and creditors evaluating the 
prospects of foreign investors in a host country. By assessing the fitness of an investor’s political 
risk mitigation strategy, these financial actors may more accurately determining the proper scope 
and price for cover or credit. 
Future Research 
Substantial work clearly remains. A depiction of an investing organization’s internal  
decision-making process similar to the depiction of the policymaking process offered here would 
be beneficial, as would a more complete treatment of the differences in decision-making 
processes, external linkages and capabilities among investing firms.  
We believe that the determinants of the longevity of recent reforms in infrastructure 
sectors offer a fruitful starting point for empirical research. The legitimacy of privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization in a given country can be proxied for by the level of public-sector 
involvement in the economy overall. Measures of government ownership of assets, the 
government labor force, and government subsidies and transfers as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product can help to sort among countries for which privately-owned and operated 
infrastructure services are likely to be seen as more or less legitimate. We can also readily obtain 
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indicators of the time since the initial reform, the subsequent distribution of macroeconomic 
shocks, institutional checks and balances, and in some cases relevant external organizational ties. 
Additional applications could include the adoption of bilateral investment treaties, commitments 
to multilateral organizations, and changes in trade policy.  
While our analysis has emphasized the context of foreign investment in host countries 
and focused on the legitimacy of distributional outcomes as an impetus for change in emergent 
institutions, similar arguments may generalize to other institutional contexts in which legitimacy 
derives from other types of outcomes. Quantitative and qualitative studies in a range of contexts 
will, we hope, complement each other in the further development of this framework for 
understanding change in emergent institutions.
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1 We focus on outcomes, but processes and structural type may also be used in normative assessments 
(Suchman, 1995).  
2 Individuals may be “informationally impacted” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or “boundedly rational” 
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Simon, 1961; Williamson, 1996). 
3 In a related line of research, Sidak and Spulber (1997) argue that there exists an implicit regulatory 
contract between the government and private actors that “constrains the private exercise of monopoly power” in 
exchange for “a reasonable opportunity to recover the economic costs of long-lived unsalvageable assets.”  
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